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Sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9) of the
Uniform Commercial Code: The Requirement
of Buying From a Person in the Business of
Selling Goods of That Kind
When a debtor' sells goods2 which have served as collateral, the security
interest in those goods is usually terminated, either because the sale was
authorized by the secured party3 or because the sale was to a "buyer
in ordinary course of business' '4 under section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.' This section provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section
1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged
in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his
seller even though the security interest is perfected and even though
the buyer knows of its existence.'
In order to qualify as a "buyer in ordinary course of business" one must
fulfill the requirements of section 1-201(9), which provides:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of
the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in the goods
buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods
of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker.'
Throughout this note the term "debtor" refers to a person who is both a debtor to
a secured party and a seller to a third party.The term "goods" is defined by U.C.C. § 9-109 (1962). "Goods" is used throughout
this note rather than "inventory," which is a subset of "goods," id. at (4), because U.C.C.
§ 9-307(1) (1962) applies to all "goods" and not solely to "inventory."
3 U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962).
' When the debtor is authorized to sell, as is routinely the case with an inventory loan,
H. REILEY, GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY S 8.3 (1982) ("Nor-
mally, sales of inventory free of the security interest are expected and desired by the
secured party . . ."), the creditor's security interest is severed on the sale. Id.; T. QUINN.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST 9-307[A][2] (1978); see U.C.C.
S 9-307 comment 2 (1962).
All citations to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the 1962 official text, unless
otherwise indicated, which has been adopted in all states (Louisiana has adopted only ar-
ticles 1, 3, 4, and 5), by Congress for the District of Columbia, and by the Virgin Islands.
For a table of states that have adopted the Code, and the effective date of adoption, see
1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN. D. VAGTS & J. MCDONNELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE vii (1982). The 1962 official text and the 1972 official text, which
has been adopted in sixteen states, do not differ in regard to sections pertinent to this note.
- U.C.C. § 9-307(l).
, Id. § 1-201(9). The scope of this note is limited to an examination of the requirement
in U.C.C. § 1-201(9) that the buyer purchase from a "person in the business of selling goods
of that kind." It should be noted, however, that if any of the other requirements of the
section are not fulfilled the buyer will not qualify as a buyer in ordinary course of business.
See T. QUINN, supra note 4, at 9-307[A][7].
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If a debtor sells goods which are collateral without the authority to
sell them, then the requirement that the buyer purchase "in ordinary
course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind" is of
chief importance. Whether this requirement has been satisfied win deter-
mine whether the secured party will be able to take the goods from the
buyer to satisfy his loan to the debtor. If the buyer has bought from such
a person, he will be able to withstand any attempt by the secured party
to take the goods. If not, section 9-306(2) provides that the secured party's
lien continues in the goods, and, in the event of the debtor's insolvency,
the secured party will be able to take the goods to satisfy his loan.'
Whether the section 9-307(1) requirement has been satisfied has not
been a difficult determination for courts to make when the primary"
business of the debtor is selling "goods of that kind."" However, if sell-
ing such goods is only an incidental" or secondary" part of the debtor's
business, courts have been divided as to how the issue should be resolved."
When a secured party takes a security interest in the goods of a debtor,
8 U.C.C. S 9-306(2).
Id. S 9-503. Section 2-312(1) provides that
there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that
(a) the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and
(b) the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or other lien
or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of the contracting has no
knowledge.
While a right of action against an insolvent debtor may be of little comfort to a buyer
whose goods have been taken by a secured party, a proof of claim in bankruptcy may
eventually compensate the buyer for part of his loss.
,0 For purposes of this note, an activity is the "primary" business of a debtor when
it constitutes more than 50% of his business.
11 See, e.g., Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317
(1970).
12 As used in this note, "incidental" means sales constituting less than 10% of the debtor's
total sales. See Sea Harvest v. Rig & Crane Equip. Corp., 181 N.J. Super. 41, 436 A.2d
553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (holding that'although debtor's sales constituted only
10% of total sales, such sales were not incidental, and debtor was a "person in the business
of selling goods of that kind"). Selling can be incidental to a debtor's primary business
in several ways. See O'Neill v. Barnett Bank, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (debtor
sold aircraft out of rental inventory when primary business was renting and selling air-
craft); American Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Mar-K-Z Motors and Leasing, 57 Ill. 2d 29, 309
N.E.2d 567 (1974) (debtor sold autos when primary business was renting autos); McKenzie
v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. App. 1978) (debtor sold autos when primary business was
renting autos); McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 273 A.2d
198 (1971) (debtor sold ice cream trucks when primary business was selling ice cream
distributorship franchises); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632,
350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976) (debtor sold unfinished goods when primary business
was converting unfinished goods into finished goods and then selling the finished goods);
Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970) (debtor
sold autos when primary business was renting autos); Sindone v. Farber, 105 Misc.
2d 634, 432 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980) (debtor sold equipment used in operation of junkyard when
primary business was operating the junkyard).
"' The term "secondary" is synonymous with "incidental." See supra note 12.
" "Greater difficulty is encountered where the [debtor] is engaged only part time in




but forbids the debtor to sell them, it is because the two parties anticipate
no sale of these goods while they are in the hands of the debtor."5 Often
the debtor is expected to use the goods in business, such as when raw
materials are manufactured into finished products or consumed in the
manufacturing process. In many cases the debtor is not authorized to sell
because he is expected to rent the goods, as is the case when automobiles
are rented by an automobile rental agency. This note contends that even
if a debtor's primary business is not selling such goods he can still be
a "person in the business of selling goods of that kind." The following
examples are illustrative.
Example one: Average Buyer decides to purchase a certain type of chain
saw. The only place Average Buyer can find one is Bargain Rent-All, a
renter of work tools. Bargain has financed its operation by putting up
its rental equipment as collateral. Its security agreement forbids the sale
of collateral. Bargain has never.sold any of its rental equipment. In addi-
tion, it is not customary in the work tool rental industry to sell used equip-
ment. Tools are normally rented until they are unprofitable to repair and
are then returned to the manufacturer for rebuilding." However, Average
Buyer persuades Bargain to sell the chain saw.
Example two: Average Buyer decides to purchase a certain model
automobile.1 7 The only place in town that has one is Auto Rentals, a com-
,1 A secured party will forbid his debtor to sell secured goods only if the remedy of
repossession from the buyer is commercially reasonable. If a good has no resale value follow-
ing repossession from the buyer, it would be a useless exercise to take it from the buyer
in order to satisfy the debt. A half-used bottle of mouthwash, for example, is virtually
unmarketable. Indeed, such goods are often completely consumed long before a secured
party could recognize a need to take possession of the collateral. Even if the bottle of
mouthwash had not been opened, the transaction costs of repossession exceed the prob-
able resale value. Many other types of goods, food items being the most obvious example,
have this same characteristic. Conversely, where the goods could have a resale value to
the lender after repossession, the lender might forbid their sale by the debtor. Occasion-
ally, the two parties do contemplate a sale of the goods in the hands of the debtor, but
the secured party does not authorize the debtor to sell unless the debtor has secured the
express permission of the secured party. In this way the secured party retains greater
control over the disposition of the goods.
,6 Statements concerning industry custom in the work tool industry are hypothetical.
" Automobiles and other vehicles that are covered by a certificate of title pursuant
to U.C.C. § 9-103(2) present issues which are beyond the scope of this note. Questions arise
"when a secured party who has recorded his security interest on a certificate of title claims
that certificate of title law governs his rights against a purchaser of the auto who claims
that 9-307 governs." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 1075 (2d ed. 1980). Professors White and Summers conclude that they
have found no case which squarely holds that the rights of a purchaser of
a used car from a dealer are superior to those of a secured party who has
recorded his security interest under a certificate of title act, [but] the trend
favors the purchaser. In this situation the purchaser's position is supported
by sound technical and policy arguments. In the first place the misconduct
of the dealers in these cases is normally more susceptible to control by the
secured party than by a purchaser who has neither the leverage nor the op-
portunity to exercise control over a dealer. Secondly, the purchaser in such
cases falls squarely within the class of persons section 9-307(1) is designed
19821
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pany which rents automobiles. Auto, like Bargain, has financed its opera-
tion by putting up its rental equipment as collateral for a loan. Normally,
Auto does not sell its collateral because its security agreement forbids
it to do so, but it has done so sporadically in the past. It is common prac-
tice in the automobile rental industry to sell used automobiles when they
are no longer profitable to maintain as rental units. Average Buyer pur-
chases the automobile from Auto.
Although both examples describe debtors which are rental companies,
the situations presented above have different consequences. This note
argues that the debtor in example one, Bargain Rent-All, is not a person
in the business of selling power tools, but that the debtor in example
two, Auto Rentals, is a person in the business of selling automobiles for
purposes of section 9-307(1). In the event of Bargain's insolvency, its
secured lender will be able to take the chain saw from Average Buyer
in order to satisfy its loan while Auto's. secured lender will not be able
to take the automobile from Average Buyer under any circumstances.
The bases for these contentions are examined in the sections which follow.
This note discusses the language and policy of sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9)
of the Code and analyzes the tests and factors used by the courts in deter-
mining who is a "person in the business of selling goods of that kind"
in cases where the selling is incidental to the debtor's primary business.
This note submits that in light of the policies behind section 9-307(1) the
circumstances of each debtor must be examined in order to determine
whether he is a "person in the business of selling goods of that kind."
CONFLICTING POLICIES BEHIND THE BUYER IN ORDINARY
COURSE OF BUSINESS RULE
The rule embodied in section 9-307(1) of the Code is an exception to
to protect. Moreover, section 9-302(3) does not render the whole of Article
Nine inapplicable. It merely excludes some transactions from the Code's fil-
ing system.
Id. at 1076-77. See Correria v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 235 So. 2d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970); Cunningham v. Camelot Motors, 138 N.J. Super. 489, 351 A.2d 402 (1975); Sterl-
ing Acceptance Co. v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.2d 600 (1961); Associates Discount
Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970); Murray, Security Interests in
Inventory: Priorities and Problems, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 634, 657 (1971) ("It would appear
that [the practice of floor plan lenders of keeping possession of title certificates] affords
little protection to the lender even in a state which has a rather strict car title statute
because section 9-307(1) comes into play to protect the buyer in the ordinary course.")
The possibility of conflicts between secured parties who have noted their liens on cer-
tificates of title and purchasers who claim under U.C.C. S 9-307 is somewhat lessened
because "not all states have enacted certificate of title laws, and of those that have, not
all require notation of liens as the exclusive mode of perfection." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS.
supra, at 977. For a list of states in which perfection of a security interest in a good covered
by a certificate of title can only be accomplished by notation of the security interest on
the certificate, see Note, Interstate Movement of Motor Vehicles: Certificate of Title Acts
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 373, 376 n.26 (1975). For a list of
those states which require some other act, in addition to or instead of notation on the
certificate of title, see id. at 378 n.27.
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the general rule that when a debtor sells goods which operate as col-
lateral and which he has been forbidden to sell, the creditor's security
interest in the goods continues notwithstanding sale.18 The drafters of
the Code have provided that certain buyers take the goods for which they
have paid free of any security interests. 19
The extent to which section 9-307(1) of the Code allows buyers to take
free of security interests is determined by the equilibrium point' between
two conflicting policies. The policy behind the general rule is to protect
the interests of the secured lender when a debtor sells his collateral
without authorization. Allowing the security interest to continue in the
goods is one way the secured party can be protected in the event that
the debtor becomes insolvent. This also encourages lenders to finance
businesses. The policy behind the section 9-307(1) exception is to allow
buyers to feel confident that their ownership of the purchased goods will
not be disputed."1 A buyer will be reluctant to buy goods if he perceives
that a secured party will be able to take those goods from him in order
to satisfy the seller's debt.'
U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
12 Id. 5 9-307(l).
The term "equilibrium point" as used in this note means the point at which the weight
given to one of the two conflicting policies equals that given to the other.
21 Many commentators believe that the policy of protecting the innocent purchaser for
value should be furthered in all cases unless there is a strong reason against it. See 2
N.Y. LAW REV'N COMM'N 1954 REPORT-STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at 1018,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1954); Comment, Section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C.: The Scope of the Pro-
tection Given a Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 985, 992
(1968); Annot., supra note 14, at 341. But cf. T. QUINN. supra note 4, at 9-307[A][3] (narrows
the policy to protect only the "run-of-the-mill off-the-shelf purchase"); Skilton, Buyer in
Ordinary Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis.
L. REV. 1, 22 (narrows the scope of the policy).
This policy has been referred to as a policy of "utility," Skilton, supra, at 3, which
serves to promote the "free movement of goods," 2 N.Y. LAW REV'N COMM'N 1954 REPORT,
supra, at 1018. See B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COIM-
MERCIAL CODE 3.4 (1980); Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts Under Section 9-307(1) of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 U. CoLo. L. REV. 333, 352 (1975); Kennedy, Secured Lend-
ing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 83 BANKING L.J. 283, 285 (1966); Warren, Cutting
Off Claims of Owmership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHL L. REV. 469, 493
(1963); Special Project-The Priority Rules of Article 9, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 834, 946 (1977);
Comment, supra, at 990-91. Section 9-307(1) is certainly sound business practice. Skilton,
supra, at 88. If a consumer were required to check security records every time he intended
to buy a good it would seriously hinder business at the retail level. See infra note 39 and
accompanying text. By protecting the good faith purchaser for value, the Code has allowed
inventory financing to exist. 1A P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. MCDONNELL, supra
note 5, § 7.11A[2][q]; see W. HAWKLAND. A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE 702 (1964); Coogan, Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 1012,
1016 (1977). Without the buyer in ordinary course rule, inventory financing would be very
unpopular with the secured party, the debtor, and the buyer. All three want to see goods
sold quickly and easily with a minimum of dispute both before and after the sale.
' Blackstone wrote: "[lit is expedient, that the buyer, by taking proper precautions,
may at all events be secure of his purchase, otherwise all commerce between man and
man must soon be at an end." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 449. See Cohen, The
Future Advance Interest Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Validity and Priority, 10
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1968); Skilton, supra note 21, at 88.
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The equilibrium point between these policies is defined by the drafters
of the Code as those cases where the buyer is purchasing "in ordinary
course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind."' Thus,
buyers who fulfill this requirement will take free of security interests
regardless of whether the seller was authorized to sell, and secured par-
ties will retain their security interest in the goods only when the buyer
does not fulfill the requirement.
Certain inferences can be drawn from the way in which the drafters
have described the equilibrium point. First, the ordinary, run-of-the-mill
purchase will come within the section 9-307(1) exception. Most purchases
are made from those who clearly are persons in the business of selling
such goods. For instance, groceries are bought in grocery stores, medicines
in drug stores, and shoes in shoe stores. Second, a person who is clearly
in the business of selling goods of that kind may also rent such goods,
or rent and sell other goods, and the purchase will still be within the
section 9-307(1) exception; there is no requirement that the debtor sell
such goods to the exclusion of other goods and services.5 Third, the
drafters of the Code focused on the seller of the goods rather than the
buyer. Assuming that the buyer fulfills the requirements of section
1-201(9), his identity and other characteristics are irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether the purchase comes within the exception."8 Therefore,
if a seller is a "person in the business of selling goods of that kind," then
all persons buying from him "in ordinary course"" will take free of any
security interest. Whether a purchase falls within the exception will be
dependent on the characteristics and circumstances of the seller or the
seller's business.
The remainder of this note will be devoted to addressing two ques-
tions raised by these policies: first, on what basis are buyers who pur-
chase from persons in the business of selling goods of that kind protected;
and second, what factors determine whether a seller has the characteristics
of a person in the business of selling goods of that kind?
ESTOPPEL AND THE BUYER IN ORDINARY COURSE
OF BUSINESS RULE
The basic principle behind the rule embodied in sections 9-307(1) and
1-201(9) of the Code is equitable estoppel." This estoppel principle can
U.C.C. 5 9-307(1).
24 See T. QUINN, supra note 4, at 9-307[A][3].
U.C.C. S 9-307(1).
The Code looks to the characteristics and circumstances of the seller, not the buyer.
See id.
U.C.C. S 9-307(1).
See id. SS 1-201(9), 9-307(1); 3 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
S 801-821 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941). Originally the basis of the buyer in ordinary course
of business rule was not only estoppel but fraud. See 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
[Vol. 58:335
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apply to either the secured party or the buyer. When a secured party
allows goods to be held by a debtor who is a "person in the business
of selling goods of that kind" he will be estopped from later claiming a
continuing security interest in them. When a buyer purchases goods from
a seller who is not a "person in the business of selling goods of that kind"
he will be estopped from later claiming that he relied on the seller's posses-
sion or other evidence of ownership. Thus, proper application of section
9-307(1) requires both some circumstances justifying the buyer in failing
to make an inquiry and a basis for throwing the loss on the secured party.'
The secured party, by allowing the debtor to have possession, has placed
him in a position of apparent authority to sell the goods." Limitations
on the debtor's power to sell, either to certain persons or under certain
circumstances, are not advertised to the general public. The filing of such
limitations does not help prospective buyers who have no reason to check
the filing records since they have not been given notice or any reason
to believe that the sale is in violation of a security agreement." Those
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 26.2, at 679-80 (1965); see generally 2 J. POMEROY, supra, § 660;
Gilmore, Article 9: What it Does For the Past, 26 LA. L. REV. 285, 288-89 (1966). The power
of the debtor to sell was regarded as inconsistent with the secured party's claim of a security
interest. 2 G. GILMORE, supra, at 680. Gradually it came to be held that the debtor's power
to sell "was not conclusive but merely presumptive evidence of fraud," unless the debtor
had been allowed to keep the proceeds for his own benefit. Id. With the rise in acceptance
of the floating lien, a lender's attack upon the buyer's title by virtue of the debtor's fraud
could no longer be a consideration in inventory financing. Codifications of the buyer in
ordinary course of business rule paved the way for acceptance of the floating lien. For
example:
In 1941 the New York Legislature added to the Chattel Mortgage Act a sec-
tion authorizing the financing of dealer inventories under chattel mortgages
in much the same way that they could be financed under trust receipts; this
section, consistently with all other modern inventory statutes, expressly pro-
vided that: "A buyer in ordinary course of trade, purchasing from a dealer
any goods covered by any such mortgage, shall acquire such goods free and
clear of the lien or encumbrance of said mortgage."
2 G. GILMORE, supra, at 684 (footnotes omitted). It became clear that the underlying
principle of estoppel, and not fraud, was to be the basis for later modification of the rule.
In 1956 the New York State Law Revision Commission recommended that § 9-307(1) be
revised to "make it clear that 'entrusting' of the goods to the seller, by the person whose
security interest is cut off, is the controlling factor." N.Y. LAW REV'N COMM'N 1956
REPORT-STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at 475, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (1956)
(emphasis added).
1 N.Y. LAW REVN COMMrN 1955 REPORT- STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, at
241, N.Y. Leg. Doe. No. 65 (1955).
1 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, §§ 809-813; see 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 28, at 681;
L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 368-72 (2d ed. 1959); see also Warren, supra note
21, at 470.
31 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, §§ 809-813. In Denno v. Standard Acceptance Corp.,
277 Mass. 251, 255, 178 N.E. 513, 515 (1931), it was held that:
the implied notice arising from recording a mortgage is not enough as a mat-
ter of law to offset the inference of authority to sell arising from the cir-
cumstances here found. Nor is the general knowledge of automobile finance
possessed by the plaintiff enough, as a matter of law, to destroy his good faith.
In European-American Bank & Trust Co. v. Sheriff of the County of Nassau, 97 Misc.
2d 549, 553, 411 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1978), the court stated:
1982]
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buyers who have actual knowledge of such a violation will be estopped
from claiming reliance on the debtor's apparent authority to sell, 2 but
as to innocent buyers, unless some objective circumstances of the sale
put them on notice to check the record, they will be able to rely on the
debtor's apparent authority.' Simply knowing that a security agreement
between a secured party and a debtor exists will not serve to refute the
buyer's good faith and lack of knowledge. 4
This estoppel analysis may be used to set out the circumstances in which
the secured party will be estopped from asserting his security interest
in the goods sold by his debtor, and to determine when a buyer from
the debtor will be deemed to have been put on notice so as to estop him
from claiming reliance on the debtor's apparent authority to sell the goods.
Three possible situations exist which demonstrate the problems a
secured party faces in attempting to determine if he would be estopped
from asserting his security interest against a buyer of the goods. In the
first two it is readily apparent whether or not the debtor is a "person
in the business of selling goods of that kind," and the consequences for
the secured party clearly follow. In the last situation the status of the
debtor is not so apparent. This leads to a consideration of what cir-
cumstances should put the buyer on notice.
The Debtor Is Clearly a Person in the Business of
Selling Goods of That Kind
The first situation is one in which the secured party allows the goods
to stay in the possession of a debtor who is clearly a person who regularly
sells goods of that kind, although the security agreement forbids the debt-
or to sell the goods. For example, a secured party may have a security
interest in a rental automobile which is possessed by a debtor who both
rents and sells used automobiles. The debtor represents to the lender
that the automobile is to be used as a rental; hence, the security agree-
ment does not contemplate or authorize its sale. However, the debtor
is clearly in the business of selling such automobiles.
It was not incumbent upon petitioner to make a search for any possible security
interests. As one court has stated: "Whatever the common-sense appeal of
this argument, it would appear that [petitioner] is not to be charged with such
bad faith as would deprive it of the protection afforded buyers in the ordinary
course of business by Section 9-307 merely because it failed to search for liens."
[Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental System, 35 A.D.2d 35, 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d
317, 320 (1970)].
See U.C.C. § 1-201(9); see generally supra note 28.
See generally 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, §§ 809-813.
U.C.C. S 9-307 comment 2 provides that "the buyer takes free if he merely knows
that there is a security interest which covers the goods but takes subject if he knows,
in addition, that the sale is in violation of some term in the security agreement." Accord
Comment, supra note 21, at 994-97. See also Knapp, Protecting the Buyer of Previously




In this situation, the secured party runs the risk that prospective buyers
will be led to believe that the debtor owns or has authority to sell the
goods. If the secured party does nothing to inform buyers that it holds
a security interest in the goods being purchased or that the debtor does
not have authority to sell the goods, then the secured party is, by its
silence, taking a known risk" that the debtor will violate the security
agreement by selling to a buyer in ordinary course of business. Once the
goods are purchased from a debtor who is a "person in the business of
selling goods of that kind," the security interest in the goods is destroyed,
and the secured party must depend on the debtor to turn over the pro-
ceeds from the sales. The secured party knew or should have known that
such a debtor could sell free of his lien to an innocent buyer for value,
regardless of whether there were limitations on the debtor's ability to
sell." Thus, the secured party will be estopped from claiming a continu-
ing security interest in the collateral. 7
Since the debtor regularly sells goods of that kind, no notice, either
I The "known risk" taken by a secured party has been clearly documented. Professor
Clark reasons:
Upon Dealer's default, can the manufacturer recover the cars from the con-
sumer purchasers on the ground that they were financed as "equipment" and
not as "inventory"? Although § 9-307 is silent on this question, Gilmore argues
that the buyer should win. The policy of protecting the reliance interest of
ordinary course buyers applies with force in such a situation. The manufac-
turer should be aware of this danger, and of the false impression that is created
when the cars are the same goods as those sold in ordinary course by Dealer.
B. CLARK, supra note 21, 3.4 [2], at 3-22 to -23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Professor
Skilton states that
the secured party who permits a dealer to have possession of the collateral
runs the risk that a buyer taking from the dealer, and reasonably supposing
that the sale to him is in order, may qualify as a "buyer in ordinary course
of business," even if he knows of the existence of the security interest.
Skilton, supra note 21, at 4. See W. HAWKLAND, supra note 21, at 702 ("although the Code
validates the 'floating lien,' a financier employing it may assume a number of business
risks unless he takes appropriate action in supervising the collateral and policing the agree-
ment.") The court in Rome Bank & Trust Co. v. Bradshaw, 143 Ga. App. 152, 157, 237
S.E.2d 612, 615 (1977) stated:
Once the buyer purchases the vehicle in the ordinary course of business,
the lien which the lending institution holds vanishes .... The lender in order
to protect itself must rely on other avenues available to it under the provi-
sions of the Commercial Code and commercial practice. Between the two, the
party who must suffer the consequences of any loss that might occur is the
lending institution and not the buyer who is clearly estopped from the problem
of dealer insecurity or insolvency.
Professor Gilmore states that "for a secured party to be subordinated under § 9-307(1),
he should know when he enters the financing transaction that he is financing goods of
a type which the seller can sell to a 'buyer in ordinary course of business.' " 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 28, 5 26.8, at 700; see also Knapp, supra note 34, at 884 ("When a creditor under
Article 9 lends against the security of goods held for sale, he knows (or should know) that
the debtor will have the power ... to convey to any [buyer in ordinary course] a good
title to such merchandise, free of the secured party's claim.").
3, 3 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, § 809-813.
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actual or constructive,' of the secured party's interest, or the fact that
the sale would be violative of the security agreement, is given to a pro-
spective buyer. Faced with a common situation, that of a person selling
the same type of goods that he ordinarily and regularly sells, the buyer
has no indication that buying the goods may violate a security agreement
between the debtor and his secured lender. No warning is given to the
buyer which would prompt him to check the record. Since there is nothing
to make the buyer wary or suspicious of the transaction, the secured party
is estopped from asserting its security interest. To require the buyer to
always check the record, whether or not the transaction was suspect,
would be commercially unreasonable and unworkable.1 9
" The terms "actual notice" and "constructive notice" are borrowed from 2 J. POMEROY,
A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. S. Symons 1941) in which a system of
principles and terms is developed to deal with the different types of notice associated with
real property recording acts. These terms are more accurate and useful than the simple
"notice" definition in U.C.C. S 1-201(25).
Actual notice, according to Pomeroy, is information concerning a prior hostile claim that
is directly or personally communicated to the buyer. It may or may not convey complete
knowledge of the prior claim. If, from direct or circumstantial evidence, "the court or the
jury is entitled to infer, as a conclusion of fact, and not by means of any legal presump-
tions, that the information was personally communicated to [the buyer,] the notice is actual:'
2 J. POMEROY, supra, S 595 (emphasis omitted). Actual notice is a conclusion of fact which
can be established by all types of evidence. Id. If shown by indirect evidence, the inference
of actual notice can be defeated by proper evidence. However, the inference is absolute
in three situations: 1) if it is shown by direct evidence; 2) if the information, when prosecuted
with reasonable diligence, would have certainly led to discovery of the conflicting claim;
and 3) if, having received such information, the buyer purposefully fails to prosecute it
in a reasonable manner so that he does not discover the conflicting claim. See id. S 597.
Constructive notice is information concerning a prior hostile claim which gives the buyer
notice which is inferred through legal presumptions. It assumes that no actual notice is
shown by the evidence. Such legal presumptions are of two types, conclusive and rebuttable.
See id. S 604. The presumption is conclusive if "the circumstances are such that the
inquiry, if made and followed up with reasonable care and diligence, would lead to a discovery
of the truth" about the conflicting claim. Id. S 608 (emphasis omitted). This conclusive
presumption is irrebuttable by any.evidence. See id. The presumption is rebuttable if the
buyer "has information or knowledge of certain extraneous facts, which are not of themselves
actual [knowledge] but which are sufficient to put [the buyer] on inquiry concerning the
existence of a conflicting interest." Id. S 606 (emphasis omitted). This "prima facie"
presumption that the buyer in fact acquired the truth about the conflicting claim is rebuttable
by proper evidence. See id.
For criticism of Pomeroy's system, and the introduction of a different system, see Philbrick,
Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 259, 391 (1944).
" In support of this conclusion, Professor Gilmore has cited Helms v. American Security
Co., 216 Ind. 1, 22 N.E.2d 822 (1939), which held that the substitution of the "caveat emptor"
rule for the "innocent purchaser" rule
would be manifestly unjust, inequitable, and oppressive since no one could
safely buy anything whatever from a retail establishment without first making
a search of the county recorder's office to make certain that it was not
encumbered with a chattel mortgage, or by seeing that the purchase price
was paid to the mortgagee.
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 28, S 26.2 at 685 (quoting 216 Ind. 1, 8-9, 22 N.E.2d 822, 825).
The good faith buyer, Professor Gilmore states, "is protected not because of his praiseworthy
character, but to the end that commercial transactions may be engaged in without elaborate
investigation of property rights and in reliance on the possession of property by one who
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The Debtor Is Clearly Not a Person in the Business of
Selling Goods of That Kind
The second situation is one in which the debtor clearly is not a dealer
in such goods and therefore cannot sell free of the secured party's lien."0
An example is when a secured party has a security interest in the
machinery used in a manufacturing process. The manufacturer is in the
business of producing and selling goods produced by the machinery, not
the machinery itself.
In this situation, prospective buyers are not allowed to rely on the debt-
or's apparent authority to sell because the sale is not in the ordinary
course of business." The requirement that a buyer in ordinary course
of business buy from a "person in the business of selling goods of that
kind" is based on the presumption that since the debtor is not in the
business of selling such goods, a prospective buyer would be put on con-
structive notice, and, consequently, would check the record for a security
interest in the collateral. Upon finding the previously filed security in-
terest, he would discover that the sale would be in violation of that securi-
ty agreement. Such knowledge would prevent a prospective buyer from
relying on the debtor's apparent authority to sell. 2
When put on constructive or actual notice, buyers are presumed to act
with the reasonable diligence of a prudent man in an effort to investigate
the existence of any adverse claims. 3 To allow a lesser standard would
offers it for sale or to secure a loan." Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954). Professor Coogan explains:
The ability of a buyer in ordinary course of business to take free of a security
interest is especially important with respect to security interest[s] in inven-
tory held for sale at retail. In fact, the Code's system of inventory security
interests would be unworkable without it. If Ms. Customer, every time she
considered buying a refrigerator, or a sofa or a lawnmower, had to inquire
of her department store as to rights against the store's inventory-secured
financer [sic], the inventory financing system would be unworkable.
1A P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. MCDONNELL, supra note 5, § 7.11A[2][q], at
7AA-59. See also First Dallas County Bank v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., No. Civ.
2906, slip op. at 4 (Civ. App. Tex. Feb. 10, 1982) ("it would be impractical to expect buyers
to make a record search of financing statements each time they purchase an item in order
to ensure that the item is not encumbered") (citations omitted).
U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
" See L. VOLD, supra note 30, at 370. Professor Vold states:
Suppose ... that the resale is not made in the ordinary course of business.
The security interest remains unaffected and can be enforced against the
purchaser from the dealer even though he had no notice. The appearance of
authority to sell in the ordinary course of business does not justify reliance
thereon where sales are made out of the usual course.
Id. The 1955 New York State Law Revision Commission stated that the "apparent purpose
of Section 1-201(9) [was] to make the character of the person with whom the buyer deals
an essential element, as an indication of apparent ownership." 1 N.Y. LAw REV'N COMM'N
1955 REPORT, supra note 29, at 251.
42 See supra notes 34 & 38; U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
' See 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, § 419(c).
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be to encourage buyers not to investigate suspicious circumstances
because they might learn of conflicting claims. Such a buyer would not
be acting in "good faith.""
The effect of constructive notice, therefore, is the same as that of ac-
tual notice."5 In both cases, the drafters have determined that the buyer
will not be allowed to rely on the debtor's apparent authority to sell. 6
When the debtor is clearly not a person in the business of selling such
goods, a secured party who allows the debtor to have possession of such
goods is not risking anything as against a buyer in the ordinary course
of business. In actuality, the secured party has not given the debtor ap-
parent authority at all because the very character of the debtor prevents
a buyer from relying on that apparent authority. Hence, there is no basis
for applying estoppel to a secured party in this situation.
It Is Unclear if the Debtor Is a Person in the Business of
Selling Goods of That Kind
The final situation is one in which it is not clear whether the debtor
is in the business of selling goods of that kind. An example is when a
secured party has a security interest in the automobiles of a rental car
company. The rental company occasionally sells one of its used rental
automobiles, even thought it is forbidden to do so by its lender. In such
a case it would not be immediately clear whether or not the debtor was
a "person in the business of selling goods of that kind."
Whether the buyer will be able to rely on the debtor's apparent author-
ity should depend on whether the circumstances surrounding the debtor
put a buyer on notice.." If the buyer is put on notice, a conclusive presump-
tion that the buyer investigated and acquired knowledge of all conflict-
ing interests operates against the buyer. If the circumstances do not put
See U.C.C. S 1-201(9).
4s 2 J. POMEROY, supra note 28, 5 594.
46 The Code makes no distinction between the different kinds of notice. U.C.C. S 1-201(25)
includes both actual and constructive notice as defined by Pomeroy. See supra note 38
and accompanying text. Subsection (a) of S 1-201(25) concerns "actual knowledge," which
is contained within Pomeroy's definition of actual notice. Subsection (b) concerns receiving
"notice or notification" of a fact, also covered by Pomeroy's definition of actual notice.
Subsection (c) concerns "facts and circumstances" which give a person "reason to know"
a fact exists, a situation covered by Pomeroy's definition of constructive notice. The Code
provides that any of these situations constitutes notice. "Facts and circumstances" which
give a person "reason to know" that a fact exists have the same effect as when a person
has actual knowledge. Since U.C.C. S 1-201(9) states that knowledge that a sale is violative
of the ownership rights of a third party will prevent a person from being a buyer in ordinary
course of business, if the facts and circumstances give a buyer reason to know that a debt-
or is not a person in the business of selling goods of that kind, it will prevent that buyer
from being a buyer in ordinary course of business.
" "Under the Code, the protection afforded a security interest against sale by the debtor
is determined by the nature of the debtor," Comment, supra note 21, at 992. See Kripke,
Practice Commentary, N.Y. U.C.C. S 9-307 (McKinney 1964).
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the buyer on notice, he will be able to rely on the debtor's apparent
authority to sell and can take free of the secured party's lien. Further
inquiry requires an examination of the kinds of circumstances that put
a buyer on notice.48
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT PUT A BUYER ON NOTICE
Unfortunately, sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9) provide little assistance in
determining whether a debtor is a "person in the business of selling goods
of that kind." These sections provide no guidelines nor do they indicate
which factors might properly play a part in such a determination. It
therefore becomes necessary to return to the presumption adopted by
the drafters which underlies these sections. The drafters presumed that
a prospective buyer dealing with a debtor who was not in the business
of selling goods would have constructive notice of that fact. Such a buyer
could therefore not reasonably rely on the debtor's circumstantial author-
ity to sell since such authority would not be apparent. Since this presump-
tion is the basis of the "person in the business of selling goods of that
kind" requirement, those factors which would put a prospective buyer
on constructive notice are the factors that should be examined to deter-
mine if the debtor has met the requirement. It has been generally
acknowledged that it is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a general
rule as to what facts would in every case be sufficient to put a buyer
on notice.49 It is possible, however, to examine the factors that drafters
of the Code and courts believe put buyers on notice.
Before examining the factors, it is necessary to form some general rules
as to which types of factors should be considered. First, the only cir-
cumstances or factors which may properly be considered are those which
a buyer would know or be able to observe before the completion of the
sale.'0 Those factors which a buyer would have no way of knowing or
" "[Tlhe question [of whether a debtor is a person in the business of selling goods of
that kind] must be determined by an examination of the particular facts and circumstances
of each case .... Annot., supra note 14, at 341. Some courts have considered it a question
of fact, others a question of law. See In the Matter of Gary Aircraft Corp., 681 F.2d 365,
374 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982) (not a mixed question of law and fact); American Nat'l Bank and
Trust v. Mar-K-Z Motors and Leasing, 57 Ill. 2d 29, 33, 309 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1974) (question
of fact); Massey-Ferguson v. Hellard, 105 Ill. App. 3d 648, 655, 434 N.E.2d 295, 299
(1982) (question of fact); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 479,
392 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1979) (question of fact); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys.,
35 A.D.2d 35, 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (1970) (question of law); Antigo Co-op Credit Union
v. Miller, 86 Wis. 2d 90, 93, 271 N.E.2d 642, 644 (1978) (mixed question of law and fact).
For a thorough discussion of the distinctions between questions of law and fact, see generally
Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1867 (1966);
Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CAL. L. REV. 1020 (1967).
,9 See Philbrick, supra note 38, at 273.
From the secured lender's point of view, the only circumstances or factors that are
proper to consider are those which a lender could reasonably anticipate would be observable




observing without investigation cannot be considered because the buyer
has no reason to investigate and should not be charged with knowledge
of any fact which requires investigation. Second, the actual knowledge
possessed by a prospective buyer, other than actual knowledge that the
sale violates a security agreement, is irrelevant. The standard is an ob-
jective one, focusing on those factors which a prudent, reasonable buyer
would know or observe.51 The secured party and the prospective buyer
will consider the same factors in determining whether the debtor is a
"person in the business of selling goods of that kind" with respect to cer-
tain goods.
By examining the requirements of section 1-201(9), one can determine
some of the circumstances the drafters believed would or would not put
prospective buyers on notice. It is clear that a buyer who has knowledge
"that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods '5 2 has actual notice and cannot be
a buyer in ordinary course of business. However, the comment to section
9-307(1) emphasizes that the buyer does take free "if he merely knows
that there is a security interest which covers the goods." Thus, the fact
that the buyer is aware of a security interest is not a factor giving rise
to constructive notice that the seller is not in the business of selling goods
of that kind. Since sections 1-201(9) and 9-307(1) provide no additional
guidance as to which factors should be considered or the relative weight
which should be attached to each factor, a nonstatutory test is needed
to determine how cases in this area should be decided. Courts have created
and administered tests to determine who is a "person in the business
of selling goods of that kind."
When applying these tests, courts have considered two main factors
which a prudent buyer should know or observe during his dealings with
the debtor. Neither factor is conclusive and a proper determination con-
siders both. In order of importance, these factors are: first, whether the
sale was in accordance with the standard or custom of the debtor's
industry;" and second, whether the debtor has made it his own standard
"1 The only subjective requirements imposed by S 1-201(9) are that the buyer be "in
good faith" and "without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership
rights or security interest of a third party in the goods." See supra notes 32-34, 42-44 and
accompanying text. Whether the debtor is a "person in the business of selling goods of
that kind" is a question which is answered without reference to the buyer's subjective
beliefs. See supra notes 26, 47-48 and accompanying text. Otherwise, the answer would be
totally unpredictable because it would depend on the identity and beliefs of a given buyer.
Since one of the main reasons for having such a rule is to be able to predict its outcomes,
using a subjective standard would significantly diminish the usefulness of the rule.U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
Id. § 9-307(1) comment 2.
"See Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 479, 392 N.E.2d 344,
346 (1979); J. Manes Co. v. Greenwood Mills, 75 A.D.2d 557, 558, 426 N.Y.S.2d 787,
787 (1980); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deeriffg Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 637, 350 N.E.2d
590, 592, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (1976); Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 AX).2d
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or custom to sell such goods, as evidenced by the debtor's previous
dealings.' Both factors will usually be applicable. 6 Other factors may be
considered if it can be shown that a reasonable buyer would have known
or observed them before the sale. For instance, some courts have taken
into account the fact that the debtor advertised the goods for sale57 and
the fact that the debtor sold the goods on a systematic basis.' Whether
one or more of the factors mentioned above applies in a given situation
will depend on the circumstances of each debtor.
Many courts have mistakenly considered circumstances that a buyer
could not have known or observed without investigation. 9 Courts have
inappropriately considered the purpose of a business as stated in its ar-
ticles of incorporation, 0 information contained on a business' financing
statement,6 ' testimony given by a business' former employee,62 and the
fact that the goods sold were part of the debtor's rental inventory when
the buyer did not know the goods were not part of the debtor's sales
inventory.62 None of these factors could have been considered by a pro-
spective buyer. It is also improper for a court to consider a factor on
which the buyer could not reasonably rely without investigation. One court
took into account the fact that the transaction made "commercial sense."'
35, 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317, 321 (1970); N.Y. LAW REV'N COMM'N 1956 REPORT, supra note 28,
at 60 (One general characteristic of "the changes the Code makes in the law ... is
* . . a significant increase of emphasis on statutory recognition of custom, course of dealing
and business and banking practice as the factors determining the content of many rules
and the conduct of transactions."); J. WIHTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 1069 ("It
appears the test has shifted from whether the seller was literally 'in the business' to whether
the sale was ordinary or predictable in the industry. If industry custom makes it reasonable
to expect the sale, 9-307 will cover it."); Donnelly & Donnelly, Commercial Law, 1976 Survey
of New York State Law, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 269, 298 (1977) ("it is apparent.., that a
sense of the commercial situation is necessary to determine, in each industry, when a sale
is in the ordinary course of business.").
' See American Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Mar-K-Z Motors and Leasing, 57 InI. 2d 29,
31, 309 N.E.2d 567, 568 (1974); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 479,
392 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1979); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632,
637, 350 N.E.2d 590, 592, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (1976).
1 However, one of the factors may be inapplicable in a given situation. For instance,
if an industry has no clear standard or custom, that factor will not apply.
17 See Sea Harvest v. Rig & Crane Equip. Corp., 181 N.J. Super. 41, 436 A.2d 553 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).
See Sindone v. Farber, 105 Misc. 2d 634, 638, 432 N.Y.S.2d 778, 781 (1980).
Such evidence could be relevant for impeaching the secured party's claim, but not
the buyer's claim.
" See American Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Mar-K-Z Motors and Leasing, 57 Inl. 2d 29,
309 N.E.2d 567 (1974), affig 11 Ill. App. 3d 1046 (1973) (fact allowed into evidence in the
lower court).
" See McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 603-05, 273 A.2d
198, 206 (1971).
n See American Nat'l Bank and Trust v. Mar-K-Z Motors and Leasing, 57 Ill. 2d 29,
31, 309 N.E.2d 567, 568 (1974).
' See O'Neill v. Barnett Bank, 360 So. 2d 150, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 637, 350 N.E.2d 590,
592, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (1976).
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It is doubtful that the buyer even considered this factor, much less knew
it'with sufficient certainty to depend on it.
The tests created and administered by courts to determine who is a
"person in the business of selling goods of that kind" have produced vary-
ing results. The efficacy of these judicial tests will be examined in an
attempt to determine which of them more nearly produces results that
harmonize with the policies and principles of section 1-201(9) and 9-307(1).
JUDICIAL TESTS
To be able to take free of a secured party's lien, a buyer must fulfill
the requirements of section 1-201(9). The requirement of buying "in or-
dinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind"
was intended to define professional sellers who regularly sell goods of
that kind. 5 It was meant to exclude sellers who do not make it their
business to sell such goods.' While it is easy to think of extreme examples,
the distinction is less clear in the middle. 7 To help bring this middle area
into focus, courts have devised nonstatutory tests which are of varying
degress of usefulness.
Reasonable Expectations Test
The most recent test to emerge is the reasonable expectations test.
The court in Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Ind."8 stated that
"[a]ll subdivision (1) of section 9-307 requires is that the sale be of the
variety reasonably to be expected in the regular course of an on-going
business."69 By addressing the buyer's expectations, the test seeks to deter-
mine if circumstances exist which would either cause a buyer to be on
,5 Skilton, supra note 21, at 21-22.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 22.
39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976).
61 Id. at 637, 350 N.E.2d at 593, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262-63 (citations omitted). It should be
noted that one aspect of the Tanbro court's holding, unrelated to the present inquiry, has
been controversial. Much discussion has been directed to
the Court's holding that a buyer of goods may be a buyer in ordinary course
of business under section 9-307(1) even though he knows that the goods are
not in his debtor's possession, and are held by a secured party (pledgee) under
a form of contract which does not permit the buyer to order the goods out
unless the secured party agrees. The holding has attracted wide attention
in the textile industry.
Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply Against a Secured
Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. LAw. 153, 155 (1977) (footnote omitted); see Birnbaum, Section
9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Versus Possessory Security Interests-A Reply to
Professor Homer Kripke, 33 Bus. LAw. 2607 (1977); Gottlieb, Section 9-307(1) and Tanbro
Fabrics: A Further Response, 33 Bus. LAw. 2611 (1977); Note; 9-307(1): Buyer in Ordinary
Course Strikes Again?, 31 ARK L. REV. 516 (1977); Note, The Buyer- Secured Party Conflict
and Section 9-307(1) of the UCC: Identifying When a Buyer Qualifies for Protection as a Buyer
in Ordinary Course, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 657, 683 n.221 (1982).
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notice and check the record or cause the secured party to expect that
the security interest would continue.
The reasonable expectations test avoids oversimplification problems of
earlier tests." It focuses on impressions created when all relevant cir-
cumstances of the debtor are considered. The language of the reasonable
expectations tests allows for discretion in its application and therefore
there is a danger that the test will be applied either too strictly or too
loosely. If, however, the test is applied consistently with the general rules
set forth previously71 and the relevant factors are given their proper
weight,72 the reasonable expectations test achieves the purpose under-
lying the section 9-307(1) exception.
The application of this test can be demonstrated by using the two ex-
amples set out above. In example one, Average Buyer purchased a chain
saw from a rental company which was held as collateral under a security
agreement forbidding sale. It was not customary in the industry to
sell used rental tools74 and the rental company had never sold such
tools before. Example one is thus a situation in which a sale cannot be
reasonably expected in the regular course of the rental company's
business. Example two, on the other hand, involved Average Buyer's pur-
chase of an automobile from a rental company. Like the rental company
in example one, the automobile rental company did not have authority
to sell. In the automobile rental industry, however, it was customary to
sell used rental automobiles and the rental company had occasionally done
so in the past. In example two, the sale of the used rental automobile
can be reasonably expected in the regular course of the rental company's
business. 5
In both cases in which it has appeared, the reasonable expectations
test has been applied correctly. In Tanbro it was correctly used to decide
that a manufacturer who converted "greige goods"7 into finished goods
was a person in the business of selling the greige goods. The court relied
71 See infra notes 99-101, 121-27 and accompanying text.7' See supra text accompanying notes 49-67.
See supra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
T' See supra note 16.
71 Professor Clark has suggested this result.
In Tanbro Farics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., the seller's primary business
was converting unfinished textiles into finished goods. The court held, however,
that a sale of unfinished textiles was "in ordinary course" under § 9-307 because
such sales were the industry norm, though only a secondary business for the
transferor. Using the Tanbro test- can such sales be expected as part of an
industry norm?-recurring sales of worn-out rental cars might well trigger
the protection of § 9-307(1).
B. CLARK, supra note 21, 3.411], at 3-19 (citations omitted).
7 The term "greige goods" means unfinished goods.
39 N.Y.2d at 637, 350 N.E.2d at 593, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262; see 1A P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN,
D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, supra note 5, 5 7.11A[21[q], at 7AA-60.
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heavily on the fact that it "was customary for [the debtor], and in the
trade for converters, to sell off excess goods .. .."" The debtor had sold
off excess greige goods in the past and neither the buyer nor the secured
party had reason for suspicion. In Sindone v. Farber8 the reasonable ex-
pectations test was applied to a sale of "capital inventory" equipment
used in a junkyard.0 In holding that the debtor was not "in the business
of selling goods of that kind," the court noted that the goods were "the
type of chattels which would normally alert a buyer 'to protect himself
against a possible security interest.'"81
In the Business of Selling Goods of That Kind Test
The in the business of selling goods of that kind test is little more than
a restatement of the definition in section 1-201(9), but it has been expressed
as a test, at least initially, by many courts.2 In Hempstead Bank v. Andy's
Car Rental System' the court stated the test as follows: "Did [the buyer]
purchase 'in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods
of that kind' . . . ?"I There has been a distinct difference in how this
test has been applied, depending on whether the court used other tests
as well.
Courts which have used the test exclusively have applied it in its
strictest sense.85 If the debtor's primary business was selling goods of
that kind," these courts have held that this fulfills the requirement, but
that anything less does not. Even if a debtor regularly sells a kind of
good, but those sales are only incidental 7 to his primary business, the
debtor will not be deemed to be a "person in the business of selling goods
of that kind."
Hempstead is the leading case which has applied the in the business
of selling goods of that kind test.88 In that case, the bank had a perfected
security interest in the automobiles of an automobile rental company.'
The debtor sold thirteen used automobiles to the buyer over a period
of five months. It was undisputed that "all such companies periodically
sell their used cars and replace them with used ones . . . ."' The court
39 N.Y.2d at 637, 350 N.E.2d at 593, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
7' 105 Misc. 2d 634, 432 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980).
Id. at 639, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
Id.
Some courts have stated this test but have not applied it. See infra note 101.
35 A.D.2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970).
Id. at 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 320 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., id.
See supra note 10.See supra note 12.
35 A.D.2d at 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
Id. at 36, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
Id. at 37, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
91 Id. at 38, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 320-21.
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stated that the "periodic sale of [the debtor's] used cars was merely in-
cidental to its leasing or rental business."9 In the court's opinion, section
9-307(1) had no application to "such incidental sales."9 The holding,
therefore, was that "as a matter of law, [the buyer] did not purchase from
a person engaged in the business of selling cars .... ."',
The court's analysis in Hempstead consisted almost entirely of a rejec-
tion of the test the defendant proposed, the debtor's inventory test. While
the Hempstead court may have been justified in criticizing and refusing
to apply that test," it employed an inadequate test itself. To say that
the requirement of buying from a "person in the business of selling goods
of that kind" is fulfilled only if selling goods of that kind is the debtor's
primary business is to oversimplify the issue. Nowhere in the text or
the official comments of sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9) is mentioned a re-
quirement concerning frequency of sales.' Nowhere is there a requirement
that the sales be a certain proportion of that debtor's business. The
greatest deficiency in the Hempstead court's interpretation, however, is
that it fails to take into account any factor or circumstance other than
volume of sales as compared to the rest of the debtor's business. The
test should take into account factors which might put the buyer on notice
of possible violations of a security agreement.
The drawbacks of this test can be demonstrated by its application to
the situation in example two.9 In that example, the debtor's primary
business was renting automobiles, not selling them. Even though the
debtor occasionally sold rental automobiles and it was customary in the
debtor's industry to do so, the in the business of selling goods of that
kind test dictates that the debtor not be deemed a "person in the business
of selling goods of that kind," an erroneous conclusion."9
The Hempstead court's oversimplification and lack of analysis
demonstrate why the in the business of selling goods of that kind test
is inadequate. The test is too broad to be of any use and it does not assist
in bringing the middle ground into focus. As applied by those courts that
use it exclusively, the test is so difficult to pass that it has taken away
the middle ground altogether. Any ambiguous situations will be construed
against a finding that the debtor fulfilled the requirement. While most
courts that have considered this question have stated this test, roughly
Id. at 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
Id.
9 Id.
11 Id. The debtor's inventory test will be discussed at infra notes 102-28 and accompany-
ing text.
See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
See B. CLARK, supra note 21, 3.4[l], at 3-19 ("some courts hold that selling the items
in question does not have to be the transferor's primary business").
"' See supra notes 50-64 and accompanying text.
" See supra text accompanying note 17.
1C3 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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half have supplemented it with more precise tests."' In doing so, these
courts have actually relied on the more precise tests and have not ap-
plied the broader in the business of selling goods of that kind test. Possibly
these courts realized that the latter test does not provide accurate and
helpful guidelines.
Debtor's Inventory Test
Another test used to bring the middle ground into focus has been the
debtor's inventory test. The court in Sindone v. Farber"' stated that
"[u]nder the Code, whether a purchase was made from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind turns primarily on whether that
person holds the goods for sale. In other words, are these goods or chat-
tels the seller's selling inventory."'°3 This test has been used by several
courts," 4 but specifically rejected by others."' This test requires that the
item sold be part of the inventory of the debtor's primary business in
order for the debtor to qualify as a "person in the business of selling
goods of that kind."
The origins of the debtor's inventory test predate the 1962 version of
the Code. In the 1950 version of the Code, section 9-307(1) applied only
to inventory,"' and a "buyer in ordinary course of business" was a per-
son who bought "goods" from a person in the business of selling "goods.""'
In 1952, section 9-307(1) was expanded to apply to "inventory, and ...
other goods as to which the secured party ... claims a security interest
in proceeds."" 8 In 1956 the definition of "buyer in ordinary course of
lot Courts that stated this test but did not actually apply it include the courts in the
following cases: O'Neill v. Barnett Bank, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); McFad-
den v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971); Tanbro Fabrics
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976);
Sindone v. Farber, 105 Misc. 2d 634, 432 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980).
105 Misc. 2d 634, 432 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980).
Id. at 638, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (emphasis in original).
,o See McFadden v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 260 Md. 601, 623, 273 A.2d
198, 208 (1971); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 636, 350
N.E.2d 590, 592, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262 (1976).
05 See, e.g., Hempstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental Sys., 35 A.D.2d 35, 39, 312 N.Y.S.2d
317, 321 (1970); see also McKenzie v. Oliver, 571 S.W.2d 102, 108 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (adopted
reasoning of Hempstead).
,o' The 1950 Official Text of U.C.C. § 9-307(1) provided:
In the case of inventory, a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free
of a security interest even though perfected and even though the buyer knows
of the terms of the security agreement. A "buyer in ordinary course of business"
means a person who buys goods in ordinary course from a person in the business
of selling goods of that kind.
... U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1950).
,o The 1952 Official Text of U.C.C. S 9-307(1) provided:
In the case of inventory, and in the case of other goods as to which the
secured party files a financing statement in which he claims a security interest
in proceeds, a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security
interest even though perfected and even though the buyer knows of the terms
of the security agreement.
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business" was changed to require a purchase from a person "in the
business of selling goods of that kind."10 9 In the 1956 Recommended Text
all reference to "inventory" in section 9-307(1) was removed,"1 and the
comment stated that the reason for doing so was "because the definition
of 'buyer in the ordinary course of business' limits subsection (1) to in-
ventory cases.""'
The modern version of the debtor's inventory test is derived from the
text and official comments"' of sections 9-307(1), 1-201(9), and 9-109(4). Sec-
tion 9-307(1) refers to section 1-201(9) for the definition of "buyer in or-
dinary course of business,""' which section 1-201(9) defines as one who
purchases from a seller who is "in the business of selling goods of that
kind.""' "Goods" are broken down into the four categories of "consumer
goods," "equipment," "farm products," and "inventory.""' These categories
are mutually exclusive."' Whether a good is in a certain category depends
on its use at the time the security agreement is created."7 Thus, changes
in use after a security interest is created do not change a good's status
under the Code.
The definition of inventory in section 9-109(4) is as follows:
Goods are . . . "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds
them for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts of service
or if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work
in process or materials used or consumed in a business. Inventory
of a person is not to be classified as his equipment."
The official comment to section 9-307(1) states that "subsection [(1)] ap-
plies, in the terminology of this Article, primarily to inventory.""' 9 Thus,
"1 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE 8 (1957) (5 1-201(9)) [hereinafter cited as 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS].
,' The 1956 Recommended Text of U.C.C. 5 9-307(1) provided:
[In the case of inventory, and in the case of other goods as to which the
secured party files a financing statement in which he claims a security interest
in proceeds, a] A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section
1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farm-
ing operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though
the seruity interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of [the
terms] its existence [of the security agreement].
1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 109, at 284 (text in brackets was recommended for
deletion; text in italics is new).
'" U.C.C. S 9-307, 1956 Recommended Text, comment. See 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 109, at 284.
"I For commentary on the Code comments, see 2 N.Y. LAW REV'N COMM'N 1954 REPORT,
supra note 21, at 1317-18; B. CLARK, supra note 21, 1.1[1][a]; Gilmore, On the Difficulties
of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1355 (1948).
113 U.C.C. S 9-307(1).
,' Id. S 1-201(9).
I' Yd. S 9-109.
,, Id. at comment 2.
"1 See 1 H. BIRNBAUM, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
S21.2 at 92-93 (1954); T. QUINN, supra note 4, 9-10914].
U.C.C. § 9-109(4).
' Id. S 9-307(1) comment 2.
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it seems as if the 1956 comment to section 9-307(1) is correct and section
9-307(1) does seem to apply to "inventory." To ask if the item sold was
part of the debtor's inventory would, therefore, seem to be a valid test.
While the proceeding argument demonstrates the origin and basis of
the debtor's inventory test, the following analysis reveals that it is not
an effective test. It is true that section 9-307(1) applies primarily to
inventory,"' but it is erroneous to simply equate the set of goods which
falls under the "inventory" definition with the set of goods section 9-307(1)
was intended to cover.1"' Not all goods that are inventory are intended
to be covered by section 9-307(1).22 "Goods to be furnished under a con-
1 Id.; see B. CLARK, supra note 21, 3.4[1], at 3-19 ("The term ["buyer in the ordinary
course of business"] is limited almost exclusively to buyers out of inventory."); Murray,
supra note 17, at 650 ("Section 9-307(1) has a narrow scope as it is limited primarily to
'inventory' .... ).
"' Some commentators have created an issue from the fact that U.C.C. S 1-201(9) does
not say "inventory" specifically. Instead it says "goods," which has been taken to mean
that U.C.C. S 9-307(11 could apply to goods other than inventory.
We note that the term "inventory" is not used. The goods are described
rather in terms of who is the seller-a person who sells goods of that kind.
Ordinarily, such goods would be inventory (section 9-109); but it is perhaps
a question of semantics as to whether the old truck sold by a trucking company
is equipment no longer needed for use, or whether the truck was transformed
from equipment to inventory when put up for sale.
1A P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDONNELL, supra note 5, S 7.11[2][q][ii], at
7AA-59; see Skilton, supra note 21, at 12-13. The fact that U.C.C. § 9-307 comment 2 states
that the subsection applies "primarily," yet not exclusively, to inventory has been interpreted
as supporting this conclusion. In 1956 the New York State Law Revision Commission
described S 9-307(1) as "confusing" because it applied (at the time) only to inventory and
goods as to which the secured party filed a financing statement claiming proceeds, while
U.C.C. S 2-403(a) was broad enough to cut off a security interest in any goods. N.Y. LAW
REV'N COMM'N 1956 REPORT, supra note 28, at 67. The Committee proposed to delete the
clause limiting the subsection to inventory and goods "to which the secured party files
a financing statement in which he claims proceeds." Id. at 474-75.
Professor Gilmore, however, has taken an opposing stance. He states that it is
impossible for there to be a "buyer in ordinary course of business" of goods
which are classified either as "consumer goods" or as "equipment." Under
the definition the goods must be bought from "a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind". Both "consumer goods" and "equipment" are defined
(§ 9-109) as goods which have been bought "primarily" for use.
2 G. GILMORE, supra note 28, S 26.6, at 694 (footnote omitted). Other commentators concur
with Professor Gilmore. See 0. SPIVACK, SECURED TRANSACTIONS 53-54 (1963); Kripke, supra
note 47. One exception exists on which both Professor Gilmore and Professor Skilton agree.
If the secured party takes a security interest in goods purchased by the debtor as consumer
goods or equipment, knowing the debtor to be in the business of selling goods of that kind,
and the debtor then puts the goods in his inventory and sells them to a buyer in ordinary
course of business, the buyer should take free of the security interest under S 9-307(1).
See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 28, S 26.8, at 699-700; Skilton, supra note 21, at 13 n.36.
"= Professor Murray has stated:
[E]ven though the cars in question were classifiable as inventory under Section
9-109(4), that section is not the true test of applying the buyer in ordinary
course of business rule under Sections 9-307 and 1-201(9). The true test is
whether the car leasing business was "in the business of selling goods of that
kind."
Murray, supra note 17, at 655 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted); see 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 28, S 26.6, at 694-95.
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tract of service," "the fleet of cars owned by a car rental agency," and
"[m]aterials used or consumed in a business" are all examples of inven-
tory according to the comment on section 9-109(4)."' However, it is not
necessarily true that these types of goods were meant to be covered by
section 9-307(1).
Thus, to require simply that the purchased goods be classified as in-
ventory under section 9-109(4) reaches overbroadly because not all goods
of that type will be sold "in ordinary course" by a debtor who is "in the
business" of selling such goods.'24 The commentators to the Code recog-
nized this problem when they noted that "[g]oods to be furnished under
a contract of service are inventory even though the arrangement under
which they are furnished is not technically a sale.""' 5 In the same com-
ment "materials used or consumed in a business" were described as a
"class of goods ... not held for disposition to a purchaser.""' 6 Conversely,
if particular items of inventory are held for sale, lease, or furnishing under
contracts of service, they are not necessarily "excluded from the buying
in ordinary course rule of § 9-307(1). The determinative fact is whether
the debtor, in addition to 'leasing' or 'furnishing,' also regularly sells goods
of 'that kind.""' 27
In recent years several courts have "corrected" the defect in the
debtor's inventory test by asking whether the item sold is part of the
debtor's selling inventory." This modification excludes those goods which
are not held for sale, but it fails as well because it still does not line up
adequately with the intent of the section 9-307(1) rule. While goods which
are inventory and are held for sale will probably qualify under the sec-
tion 9-307(1) rule, the modified inventory test does not take into account
the fact that goods which are not held for sale may fit under the section
9-307(1) rule as well. Narrowing or widening the scope of the debtor's
inventory test will not improve the test because that is not where it fails.
The section 9-307(1) exception should take into account an entire set of
circumstances which will determine the set of goods it covers. Defining
a type of good is not a feasible way to attack the problem because whether
"7 U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 3.
,' See IA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS, & J. McDONNELL, supra note 5, S 6.02[2][e],
at 475 n.40 ("[Wlhile leased trucks are by definition 'inventory' of the lessor there is no
intention that these trucks could be sold free of a security interst therein merely because
they are classified as 'inventory.' "); W. HAWKLAND, supra note 21, § 2.32, at 701 ("The
definition of 'inventory,' however, encompasses more than goods held for immediate or
ultimate sale:'); Skilton, supra note 21, at 22 ("[O]nly certain kinds of inventory, as defined in
section 9-109(4), would be included" in the scope of section 9-307(1).).
" U.C.C. § 9-109 comment 3.
126 Id.
12 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 28, § 26.6, at 695; see supra note 122.
"7 Courts in the following cases have applied the modified debtor's inventory test: O'Neill
v. Barnett Bank, 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976); Sindone v. Farber,
105 Misc. 2d 634, 432 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980).
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a good falls under the section 9-307(1) rule depends on various cir-
cumstances surrounding the sale, and whether those circumstances put
the buyer on notice.
Both the original and modified debtor's inventory tests are inadequate
to assist in more clearly defining the section 9-307(1) rule. They are respec-
tively too broad and too narrow, and as such are misleading. While they
may in some cases render a correct result, there is an equal chance that
they will be wrong.
SHOULD THE CODE BE AMENDED?
The concept of a buyer in the ordinary course of business taking free
of a secured party's lien is not a new one in commercial law.'29 Although
the policies and principles behind provisions defining the abilities and
limitations of such a buyer have remained virtually unchanged, the text
of almost every successive Code version of this concept has been modified
to some degree. 3 ' These modifications have attempted to reflect chang-
ing business attitudes and to address new controversies. 3'
Amendment, however, is a "costly, cumbersome, and unsatisfactory
process."'' Often it is more desirable to examine the policies and prin-
ciples behind a provision in order to solve new problems within an ex-
isting framework than to attempt to amend the provision.'" Sections
12 See generally 1 N.Y. LAW REV'N COMM'N 1955 REPORT, supra note 29, at 227-28; 2 G.
GILMORE, supro. note 28, S 26.4, at 689-92; Skilton, supra note 21, at 4-7.
'-' See Skilton, supra note 21. For modifications of the buyer in ordinary course of business
concept within the Code, see supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
"31 U.C.C. S 1-102(1) provides that the Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies." The commentators state that the Code
is drawn to provide flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-
permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its own machinery for expansion
of commercial practices. It is intended to make it possible for the law embodied
in this Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new
circumstances and practices.
U.C.C. S 1-102(1) comment 1. Professor Gilmore has stated that "it is a matter of vital
importance that the Code as a whole be kept in terms of such generality as to allow an
easy and unstrained application of its provisions to new patterns of business behavior."
Gilmore, supra note 112, at 1355.
' Gilmore, supra note 112, at 1355.
U.C.C. S 1-102 comment 1 provides:
Courts .. .have recognized the policies embodied in an act as applicable
in reason to subject-matter which was not expressly included in the language
of the act ... [and] have implemented a statutory policy with liberal and useful
remedies not provided in the statutory text ....
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes
and policies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose
and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole,
and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly,
as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved.
Professor Gilmore explains why the Code provides room for interpretation:
There is always a choice between loose or open-ended drafting and a style
that is tight, detailed and precise. The tighter you make your statute ...
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9-307(1) and 1-201(9) provide a suitable framework for the development
of a useful nonstatutory test. The reasonable expectations test utilizes
the policies and principles of the drafters in order to bring about the result
the drafters intended. The existence of the reasonable expectations test
obviates the need to amend these sections of the Code.
CONCLUSION
Sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9) of the Code represent an equilibrium point
between the two competing policies of protecting the interests of the
secured lender and promoting the confident purchase of goods by buyers.
When the provisions of sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9) are construed con-
sistently with their policies and purposes, it is possible to form a
nonstatutory test which determines precisely who is a "person in the
business of selling goods of that kind" in a section 9-307(1) situation.
Application of section 9-307(1) to a given situation requires circumstances
which justify the buyer in failing to check the record and provide a basis
for throwing the loss on the secured party. Whether a debtor is a "person
in the business of selling goods of that kind" pursuant to section 1-201(9)
is a determination which must be based on those circumstances of each
individual debtor that a reasonable, prudent buyer should know or observe
before the sale is completed. Two main factors should always be con-
sidered. The first is whether the sale is in accordance with the standard
or custom of the debtor's industry. The second is whether the debtor
made it his own standard or custom to sell such goods, as evidenced by
his previous dealings. Other factors should also be considered if it can
be shown that a reasonable buyer would have known or observed them
before the sale was completed and that such factors would have put a
prospective buyer on constructive notice that the debtor might not be
a "person in the business of selling goods of that kind."
The reasonable expectations test, when applied in conjunction with a
consideration of applicable factors, yields a result in complete harmony
with the principles and policies of sections 9-307(1) and 1-201(9). It focuses
on the impressions created when all relevant circumstances are considered.
Other nonstatutory tests have focused on only one aspect of the debtor
and, consequently, do not produce results in accord with the purposes
of the section 9-307(1) rule.
THOMAS W. WALDREP, JR.
the more certain it is that in a very few years the statute will be out of date,
outrun by changing circumstance, no longer relevant. The more open-ended,
the less help it will be in solving real problems, deciding real cases.
Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does Not Do For the Future, 26 LA. L. REV. 300 (1966). Professor
Gilmore's choice is to "keep the Code ... as general, as unspecific as possible. Let the
strategic strong points be as widely spaced as they can be and still defend the essential
territory." Gilmore, supra note 112, at 1358.
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